2 Bitcoin Cash Mining Pools Organized 51% Attack to Thwart Hacker

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BCH’s latest software update may have brought about $1.35 million in copy transactions . A “double spend” is the thing that happens when the equivalent digital coins are invested more than one time.

Following the fork, a total of 25 transactions including 3392 BCH were excluded in the redesigned chain, implying that those 3392 BCH could have eventually stayed in an attacker’s control.

However, per the report, “the only victim with respect to these double spent coins could have been the original ‘thief’”–two mining pools (BTC.com and BTC.top) that controlled more than half of the BCH network carried out a “51 percent attack” to reverse the attacker’s transactions.

While the mining pools’ actions may have eventually been something worth being thankful for the BCH community, the move has caused some contention all things considered, the way that these two pools had the option to organize the attack uncovers that the BCH network is maybe more unified than the vast majority of its clients knew.

“To coordinate a reorg to revert unknown’s transactions,” composed Bitcoin Cash developer Kiarahpromises in a blog post. “This is a 51% attack. The absolutely worst attack possible. It’s there in the whitepaper. What about (miner and developer) decentralized and uncensorable cash? Only when convenient?”

“This is exceptionally shocking, however it is likewise what verification of work really is,” wrote Bitcoin Cash supporter Jonathan Silverblood accordingly. “The diggers for this situation chose to drop prohashes square and from what I heard, it is on the grounds that they regarded an exchange inside it to have been invalid.”

What Caused the Attack?

As indicated by BitMex’ report, the double spend seems to have been brought about by three elements. The most critical of these seems to have been an aggressor that found and exploited a vulnerability in BCH’s convention directly after the fork happened. The aggressor had the option to “broadcast transactions which met the mempool validity conditions but failed the consensus checks.”

At the end of the day, “since the original split in 2017, there has been a significant number of coins accidentally sent to ‘anyone can spend’ addresses (due to [transaction] compatibility of sigs, but no #SegWit on #BCH), or possibly they’ve been replayed from #Bitcoin onto the #BCH network,” clarified bitcoin podcast host Guy Swann on Twitter.

The attacker in this circumstance was a miner who understood that these coins were available to all.

Be that as it may, when the miner attempted to take the coins for themself, “[BTC.top and BTC.com] saw & immediately decided to re-organize and remove these [transactions], in favor of their own [transactions], spending the same P2SH coins, [and] many others.”

Swann theorized that the two mining pools more likely than not been speaking with each other secretly all through the fork, prepared to act rapidly if something turned out badly.

“Looks like they were prepared during the fork, & watching closely to recover the #SegWit coins themselves,” he composed . “Rumor is (& possibly the only thing that makes sense) that they were communicating privately the entire time during the fork.”

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